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Congress has adjourned, as we feared, before the House of Representatives had had time to consider and pass the new bill regulating the coinage. It therefore necessarily lies over to the next session. Meanwhile, our silver currency is deteriorating every day, and will soon be reduced to a condition that will call loudly for remedy. No more effectual measure for this end can be contrived, we believe, than that which was prepared, after careful deliberation, and with a full knowledge of the subject, by the advice of the Director of the Mint and the Secretary of the Treasury, and which has already received the unanimous approbation of the Senate.

ART. VI.—*Austria in 1848-49: being a History of the late Political Movements in Vienna, Milan, Venice, and Prague: with Details of the Campaigns of Lombardy and Novara: a Full Account of the Revolution in Hungary: and Historical Sketches of the Austrian Government and the Provinces of the Empire.* By W. H. STILES, late Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Vienna. New York: Harpers. 1852. 2 vols. 8vo.

WE are, perhaps, too near the time of the revolutionary movements of 1848, in Europe, to form a strictly accurate historical judgment of the men and measures of that period. Party passions are still too vehemently agitated, and the truth is seen, if seen at all, through too colored a medium, for the cool examination and impartial conclusion, which are alone of value, as lessons for the instruction of the future. But there are some general outlines, sufficiently discernible, if we will but look with a simple desire to learn. It is, for example, sufficiently evident that there is but a slight analogy between those movements, and the war of the American Revolution, either in the characters of the agents, the motives of the actions, or the aims contemplated; still less, in the condition of the uprising parties, and their preparation for the political condition to which they professed to aspire. Our ancestors were accustomed, from the first settlement of

the Colonies, to self-government, and to the enactment and execution of laws; they knew how to transact public business, with order and despatch; they understood the duty of obedience to the public will, when lawfully expressed; and each individual felt himself responsible for the course of public affairs. General education was established, in our system of public schools; and political training was incessant, in the administration of local affairs, and in the various legislative assemblies and councils to which the public affairs were intrusted. Every right, of person and property, was secure, and all citizens were on an equality; so that no social revolutions were necessary, and no violent changes, of the standing of large classes. When the time came to throw off the authority of the mother country, we had no political or social institutions to overturn; no internal convulsions to endure; no dangerous shocks to breast; and yet, the assertion of our constitutional liberties cost us a bloody war of seven years' duration.

“Tantæ molis erat, Romanam condere gentem.”

Neither of these conditions existed, in the people of any nation on the European continent, at the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1848. The monarchy of Louis Philippe was surrounded by some of the institutions of a popular government; but the constituent body was an insignificant fraction of the nation, and the legislature notoriously under the influence of the court. Yet the French enjoyed, under the rule of that able prince, a degree of liberty, security, and constitutional order, greater than in any preceding reign, and infinitely greater than they have had since, even in the days of the Provisional Government, and the nondescript “Republic,” whose ludicrous existence the ape of the great Napoleon so easily brought to an ignominious end. Red Republicanism, modelled on the Reign of Terror, Socialism, modelled on the wildest and most profligate vagaries of heathen speculation, — conspiracy without intelligible means, or practical aim, unbelief in God, and contempt for man, had long been seething in the witches' caldron of Continental underground speculations, when the strange success of a few writers in a wild attempt to overthrow the throne of

the king of the French, led to a series of explosions over Southern and Middle Europe.

Among the thinking men of Europe, there are, doubtless, many who cherish enlightened views of constitutional liberty, and keep a steadfast faith in the political destinies of the Continent; but there are more heated brains, enemies of the present order of things, with no distinct conception of a better. There are many ferocious philanthropists, who, in the mad attempt to carry their fanatical views into effect, would not hesitate to deluge the world in blood. There are multitudes of desperate, debauched, unprincipled men, who are ready for any destructive enterprise, resolved that they will not earn their bread by the sweat of their brow, so long as they can support their miserable and flagitious existence by political agitation. And there are some honest, but weak people, who believe that all the evils of the present state, and all the hardships of our common lot, may be done away by the adoption of a few fantastic social theories, which human experience and God's laws have a thousand times shown to be fallacious. But the body of the people everywhere would remain, if left to themselves, well content with their condition, humble as it is; or, if not contented, trusting to the ameliorating hand of time, and the slow but sure progress of the laws which regulate the natural growth of human societies.

The governments of Europe, founded for the most part on the feudal institutions of the Middle Ages, are, in great measure, responsible for the evil tendencies among the people. It is easy to see how, in theory, these threatening and growing mischiefs might have been averted, or may still be rendered harmless; but perhaps it is not possible to understand the full effect of the obstacles to improvement which, at any particular moment, have stood in the way of any extensively beneficent changes. The present state of affairs is more correctly to be regarded as the result of the course of things, through many centuries, of blended good and ill, during which the human race have been learning wisdom by suffering — *πάθει μάθος* — slowly moving under the guidance of Providence, towards a happier consummation in the future. But it is very clear that just ideas of liberty are lamentably wanting among

the agitated and agitating popular bodies of Europe. To a great extent, they understand liberty to be license, and the freedom to indulge the basest appetites, at the expense of the rights and honor of others ; and they look forward to exemption from that labor, which is the common doom and universal blessing, as the perfection of happiness on earth. With no faith in virtue, and no trust in the overruling providence of God, they would fain overthrow, in a moment, the institutions that are the growth of centuries ; and, believing that whatever is, is wrong, rush headlong to the corresponding conclusion, that whatever is not, is right.

The misfortune of all popular movements on the continent of Europe is, that these madmen and atheistic philanthropists, who seem to think they could have made a much better world, had the work of creation been placed in their hands, always take the foremost rank, and spoil everything by their interference. They begin by alarming governments, and end by alarming every honest man in private life ; so that, after a convulsive effort to secure some popular right, or add something to the privileges of the people, their excesses and absurdities lead to a reaction and to the reëstablishment of despotism, which the solid and substantial classes of citizens infinitely prefer to the senseless and lawless dogmas of the reformers of the world.

Between the adjustment of European affairs in 1815, and the outbreaks of 1848, the world, with few exceptions, lay in profound peace. Never, within the same period, was equal progress made in physical well-being, in the industry and intercourse that enrich every state with the products of every other, in the arts that constitute the elements of enjoyment, as well as in those that embellish and idealize human existence, in science, literature, inventions, high education, and the education of the people, — in the universal diffusion of toleration and charity in religion, of liberal ideas in politics, of wise appreciation of the past, and bright hopes of the future. Have the movements of 1848 accelerated the progress of men in any one of these directions ? Is France more free than she was previous to 1848 ? Has she a better prospect of constitutional freedom in the future, under Louis Na-

poleon, than she had under the Orleans dynasty? How stands it with the cause of liberty in Germany? Is Prussia better off? Have the Liberals of Austria and Hungary gained any important advantages, by the blood and treasure they have caused to be wasted? Is the freedom of a United Italy nearer its accomplishment, by the trial of the Republic of Rome, and the Dictatorship of Venice? He would be a bold man who durst answer either question in the affirmative. The catastrophe of all these movements teaches, by a severe lesson, that the cause of human freedom is not advanced by atheism, lawlessness, and debauchery. Doubtless, there have been, in the political troubles of the last four years, many individuals engaged in what they deemed the sacred cause of freedom, from motives that do them infinite honor; doubtless, men have fallen martyrs to their convictions of duty, and to their devotion to the rights of man; and the memory of such shall be held sacred to the end of time. But it is equally certain that the general character of the originators and actors in those scenes has been wholly different, and the movements have been stained by every crime most abhorrent to the laws of God and man. Robbery, murder, rape, conflagration have followed the footsteps of the reformers of the world; license the most frightful, obscenity the most disgusting, orgies the most bloody and atrocious, have been the ceremonies by which they have inaugurated the dawn of their imaginary millennium. The fantastic fooleries of Louis Blanc prepared the way for a despotism more inexorable than that of Napoleon; the murder of Count Latour, and the abominations of the mob of students and workmen in Vienna, were the prelude to the strengthened absolutism of the house of Hapsburg, in the person of the young Emperor, who has so prematurely been forced to ascend the throne. The brutal assassination of Count Lamberg on the bridge of Buda hastened the extinction of the Hungarian Constitution, in the blood of the noblest heroes of that devoted land. The assassination of Marinovich, in the Arsenal at Venice, brought swift destruction on that city of the Doges, and laid her prostrate and helpless at the feet of an Austrian Field Marshal.

And, at this moment, the prospect for liberal institutions

among the nations of Continental Europe is darker than it has been for the last half century; the emancipation of the nations has been thrown back by the very means adopted in the fond and fallacious hope of hastening the day of its fulfilment. It is idle to say, that this reaction is all to be attributed to the perjuries and treacheries of the crowned heads. No doubt, these have done their part; but if they had not found allies in the want of virtue and capacity in the leaders of the popular movements, in the crimes by which these movements were tracked at every step, in the hideous doctrines which they sought to consummate in practice, and in the abhorrence thus excited in the minds of the substantial classes, there would have been an end to despotism on the Continent of Europe. The most remarkable feature in these remarkable events was the absence of ability on the part of the leaders, and of sense and principle on the part of the followers. The insurgents had everything in their own hands; governments were paralyzed everywhere; every demand was conceded; and, had the men whom the revolution threw upon the surface, and placed at the head of affairs, understood their position, and had the ability to turn its advantages to account, and the intelligent patriotism to consult for the common good, and the virtue to abandon selfish schemes and projects of sensual gratification, they would have been supported by men of moderate views, whose interests depend on the preservation of order, and might have given a permanent foothold to constitutional liberty. But privy conspiracy, rebellion, and murder are not the methods God sanctions or employs to work out his gracious purposes in the history of man. The revolutionary party in Europe have too plainly shown the cloven foot. The scenes at Venice, Vienna, and Pesth are a solemn warning to the world, to put no trust in their promises, which are of less value than princes' favors. The language held by members of that party, in Europe and in America, only serves to strengthen the distrust of their motives, and horror at their projects, wherever order is valued, peace is desired, and religion revered. The fierce call for the blood of their opponents, the declared resolve to bring the present rulers of Europe to the guillotine, to wade through oceans of blood to the accomplish-

ment of their philanthropic schemes, the undisguised avowal of principles that strike at the root of the family relation, threaten the destruction of property, the overthrow of Christianity, and the utter annihilation of society as at present constituted, have excited, and continue to excite, a deeper terror than the existing evils under which the nations labor and are heavily laden, however formidable and desperate these may appear to the eye of the Christian philanthropist.

For the disorganizers have managed to stamp their own character most deeply on the political movements of Europe, and to involve the honest and patriotic reformers in the same reprobation, with which their own atrocious schemes are justly visited. This is the unhappy consummation to which they have every where brought the excited hopes of humanity. The existence of a deep-laid conspiracy, with a central organization, and affiliated branches extending through the principal nations of Europe,—with able and unscrupulous heads, who have nothing to lose, even if chaos come back again, with large funds at their disposal, and the means of secret correspondence,—has been boastfully proclaimed, for the purpose of keeping up the courage of the revolutionary party everywhere. But this fact, so far from gladdening the hopes of the true lovers of freedom, only alarms them for the future; so far from strengthening the hands of enlightened and liberal men, it only gives the minions of despotism a stronger hold upon power, and plausible arguments for refusing the smallest concession to popular or historical rights. The prospect this revolutionary party holds out to mankind is that of a universal war in Europe; a war of the people against the governments; a war of those who have nothing, against those who have something; a war of overthrow and annihilation against the present order of society, against the civilization of the age, in the vague and uncertain hope of building society up, on a different basis, and another plan, at some undefined period in the future. This is the practical meaning of their scheme, however disguised it may be under plausible phrases of philanthropy, and sophistical arguments addressed to the imaginations of the unwary.

Now, the great want of man, in the present age, and in all ages, is peace; the great bane of man, in the present age, and in all ages is, war. As we have said before, the progress of civilization, prosperity, and happiness during thirty years of peace, has been unprecedented in history. The brief and bloody wars that grew out of the insurrections of 1848 have suddenly arrested this progress, in many of its most important directions. England, protected from the worst effects of the convulsion by her temperate constitutional liberties, did not wholly escape its political consequences, as we see in the partial restoration of Toryism to power. France, where it began, lies torpid under an ignominious despotism, which, bad as it is, holds its power by a tenure more legitimate than any other existing government. It is idle to say, that either corruption or the sword brought seven millions of Frenchmen up to the polls to vote for Louis Napoleon. Prussia, after having been juggled by the delusive phantom of constitutional monarchy, has fallen back into the arms of an absolutism existing by the grace of God. The progress of science and universal education, before so honorable to that nation, and so full of hopes of golden promise for liberal and enlightened government, has suffered at least a temporary check. The Roman Republic has fallen under the arms of France, and the obsolete maxims of Papal administration are restored to much of their ancient vigor. The Italian provinces of Austria, following the revolutionary principles of Mazzini and Manin, have quenched their new-born hopes in blood, and seen their nascent republics buried beneath the ruins of the glorious monuments of past ages, and, in this forlorn condition of ruin and disaster, reconsigned to the leaden tyranny of the "foreigner" and the "barbarian." Hungary, — last and saddest of all, — Hungary, the land of generous hearts and gallant arms, the land of enthusiasm and devotion, after a brief but most bloody war, is bowed in the dust before her conquerors, her noblest sons having been saved from an honorable death on the field, only to perish by the hand of the executioner. Her constitution, which had stood a thousand years, swept away; its surviving champions, eating the bitter bread of poverty and exile, as they travel from country to country, repeating, in tones of pathetic eloquence,

the story of her unequalled woes; her territories treated like a conquered province,—which, indeed, they now are,—and reduced to the dead level of an Austrian bureaucratic administration, with no reasonable hope of better times to come.

Hungary was fast rising in prosperity, intelligence, and honor. Patriotic and enlightened men were devoting their energies and their wealth to developing her great resources, and multiplying the means of material well-being. The old feudal constitution was undergoing changes to adapt it to the wants of the present age. Nothing could exceed the brightness of her prospects, had wisdom and moderation guided her councils, when the whirlwind of 1848 struck upon her. But her leaders were enthusiasts, and the frenzy of the hour seized their hearts. In attempting to grasp more than the country was prepared for, more than the country knew how to maintain after the concession already extorted from a feeble and reluctant Emperor, in attempting to secure an impracticable independence, which a large majority of the people neither understood nor wanted, they lost all the substantial gains they had effected for twenty years; they saw the plains of their country deluged in blood, her resources exhausted, her improvements destroyed, her homes ruined or filled with mourning, her progress arrested, her condition thrown back toward the ages of barbarism, and the hopes of constitutional liberty indefinitely postponed. Here, more than anywhere else, have the hands of despotism been strengthened by conspiracy, rebellion, and war. The most tragic act of the awful tragedy commenced in 1848, is the Hungarian catastrophe. But the lesson it impressively teaches is, again, that the work of humanity, in our age, is not to be carried forward by war; and they who think to redeem the disasters of one war by the blood of another, are walking under a fatal delusion, from which they must be awakened by persuasion or steady resistance to their frantic schemes. It will take many years of unbroken peace to regain what the last few years have lost in Europe to the cause of universal liberty. Peace is the gentle minister through whose agencies the sufferings of men are to be mitigated, their wrongs redressed, and their happiness secured. They who dream to prostrate

these blessed ends by the violent works of insurrection and war, are listening to the voice of human passion, and not to the teachings of Almighty Wisdom. The general war in Europe, for which they watch and long, may come; but if it does, it comes as the scourge of God; it comes to overwhelm for a time the civilization of the world; it comes to consume, as in a devouring flame, the accumulated wealth and art of Europe; — to beat down the defences against barbarism, which have been slowly and painfully built up; to let loose every baleful passion of the human heart, pent up and curbed in a time of peace; to prepare a revel of cruelty, carnage, lust, and death, wherein the demons will gladly rush to their accursed debauch; and finally, when the despair of exhaustion has come on, and human energies are utterly prostrated, this universal war, which was to lay the oppressor low, and regenerate the world, having swept into one common ruin, oppressor and oppressed, will inaugurate a new epoch, but not of liberty. It will reinstate society, but not under constitutional forms; it will build up authority again, but not limited authority; it will reduce the world under the yoke of military tyranny, to commence again the slow progress of political improvement towards the restoration of those institutions which the storm has smitten down in the dust. If this is not to be the result of the schemes which the revolutionists of Europe avow, there is no truth or meaning in the teachings of history.

The literature of the European revolutions is now so extensive, that it is past reading and digesting. Comparatively a small portion of it is written in the impartial spirit of historical criticism. This is especially true of the works which have been called out by the Hungarian war; for in this conflict, there were peculiarities which enlisted the powerful sympathies of the parties of progress in England and the United States. They have been discussed with the vehemence which is usually confined to questions of domestic politics; and have given rise to crimination and recrimination, the bitterness of which has blinded the judgment, roused the vindictive passions, and corrupted the taste. One would suppose, from the dreadful earnestness of the disputants, that salvation

itself depended upon the acceptance or rejection of certain dogmas relative to the Magyar race and the Hungarian rebellion.

A few years ago, but little was known of this people, save that they were a brave and gallant, but not highly civilized nation — one of the component elements of the kingdom of Hungary, and a part of the disjointed empire of Austria. Nine centuries ago, a warlike horde — described by an early Latin chronicler as a race born of demons on the bank of the Jordan, and so filthy and base that, in the language of the pious writer, the supreme Clemency that permitted them to live at all was a subject of incomprehensible wonder — came into Europe from Asia on horseback, and conquered the aborigines of a part of Hungary. The descendants of this horse-taming multitude, whose personal appearance and character are so heavily maligned by the scandalous old chronicler, are the Magyars of the present day, and the ruling race in Hungary, where they have maintained themselves, separated in language, manners, customs, and political constitution from the other tribes that surrounded them, in the *colluvies gentium* on the Danube. The Slaves and Croats have never fairly reconciled themselves to the predominance of their oriental invaders and masters. The Magyars have taken but little part in the civilization of Europe. Something was known of their popular poetry, in the translations given to the world, a few years ago, by Dr. Bowring. Since, then, other branches of their literature, not very extensive or important, but interesting as showing the literary development of a language of inferior organization, and of a national genius that had only recently manifested any aptitude for culture, have been discussed in some of the European journals, and still more in our own pages. The elaborate and classical work of Paget communicated to western Europe a picture of Magyar life, as authentic as it is admirably painted, previous to the recent war. And since that calamitous series of events, the works of Schlesinger in Germany, Patten in England, Tefft and Brace in our own country, have been eagerly and universally read. Klapka, Pragay, and other distinguished actors in the bloody scenes of the revolution, have described, with more or less completeness,

the events which they witnessed or participated in. Kossuth, in his extraordinary orations — extraordinary in rhetorical merit, and miraculous in number — has explained his own position, both in England and the United States, — the only two countries now enjoying the rights of freedom of speech. The members of his cabinet have spoken out, from time to time, mostly in censure of his opinions and condemnation of his conduct. And finally, after two years of silence and seclusion, General Görgey appears again upon the scene, with two volumes of vindication and defence from the heavy charge of treason, brought against him wherever the Hungarian exiles have found sympathy and support. These are only a selection of the works which the events referred to have brought out within the last few years.

Mr. Tefft's book is written with the spirit of a scholar, and is the result of much investigation. It is very comprehensive in its plan, elegant in its style, and interesting in its matter, embracing an outline of the political history of Hungary, a sketch of her language and literature, and a history of the Hungarian war, with a full account of the public career of Kossuth. But it is strongly colored with an admiration for the Magyars, and absolute and unhesitating approbation of their cause. Brace's work is one of less substantial merit, but is written with liveliness of style, and has all the attraction of personal adventure. Mr. Brace is a young American of talent and spirit. Visiting Hungary for no political object, yet, with the frankness natural to a free citizen, he conversed in a manner to excite the suspicions of the Austrian police, and paid the penalty of incarceration for a month, obtaining his liberation with no little difficulty even then. His book, naturally, is marked by strong dislike of Austria, and equally strong partialities for the Magyars. He is hasty in his generalizations, his observations having continued only a few weeks in Hungary, and one month in an Austrian fortress. But it is interesting and clear, and not without its value for the isolated pictures it presents of Hungarian society since the war.

But the most elaborate and important work is that whose title is placed at the head of the present article, — "*Austria in 1848-49*," by Mr. Stiles, the late *Chargé*

d'Affaires of the United States at the Court of Vienna. Placed in the Austrian capital, at the time of these transactions, in a high official station, he had the best opportunities of observing the course of events, and obtaining the most authentic documents. He has made use of all these sources of information, with praiseworthy impartiality and distinguished ability; and has wrought out a narrative of events, we are persuaded, more to be relied upon than any which has yet appeared in our language. His reflections are generally very judicious and instructive; and his conclusions are marked by the candor and intelligence which were to be expected from one honored with the confidence of his country in so important a post. For the most part, his style is clear and dignified, but the book is disfigured by numerous typographical errors. Here and there occur contradictory opinions and expressions, which are not to be wondered at, on subjects still unsettled in the opinions of the world. His sketches of the principal characters in the drama are well drawn, and highly interesting. On the whole, we may say that this work is one of the most important and trustworthy contributions to the political and military history of the present times. The historical introductions to the several divisions of the work are of special value, having been drawn up after a diligent study of the best and most authoritative writers.

The first volume opens with a summary of the history of Austria and its provinces, down to the treaty of Vienna in 1815, and a sketch of her foreign policy, from the treaty of 1815 to the revolution of March, 1848. On this last topic, Mr. Stiles is particularly instructive. The internal administration of the empire is next discussed, in all its branches. At the close of this chapter, he states a few interesting facts relating to the views entertained by Prince Metternich upon the prospects of Europe; but he hardly does justice to the sagacity of that eminent man. From a recently published pamphlet, printed by him for private distribution among his friends, it is evident that Metternich clearly foresaw, in outline, the great events which have taken place in Hungary.

Book second begins with an account of the French movement of 1848, and its effects upon the Austrian cabi-

net and capital, and the measures taken in consequence. This is succeeded by an animated sketch of the measures taken by the government, to carry into practical effect the concessions just made, — measures, which, in the language of Mr. Stiles, “manifested a sincere desire, as well as effort, on the part of the government, to fulfil its promises, and carry out the reforms projected.” The author next proceeds to point out the principal difficulties to which the Empire was at that time exposed; the differences of race; the sudden transition from an absolute to a constitutional government; and the troubles arising from the want of a popular ministry. The consequences of some or all these circumstances soon began to show themselves.

“It might have been expected that the people, duly acknowledging the important concessions granted them by the crown, would have rendered all the aid in their power towards carrying out the reforms which it had promised, and which it exhibited every disposition faithfully to fulfil. Such, however, was far from being the case. The gratitude which they felt, though almost unbounded at first, was but of short duration; and in a very few days, every effort on the part of the people was made to increase those embarrassments, already nearly insurmountable.

“Even the students of the university, whose important and laudable efforts had contributed so much to the success of the Revolution, became perfectly intoxicated by the glory which they had acquired, and the praise and homage bestowed upon them from every quarter, and soon conducted themselves in a manner, not only to tarnish the fair fame which they had acquired, but to cover themselves with disgrace.

“As soon as it became known throughout Europe that Austria had joined the progressive movement of the times, emissaries from different parts of the Continent, particularly from France and Northern Germany, flocked to Vienna, and, by their acuteness and activity, soon discovered the elements upon which to base their operations. The students of the university, ardent, inexperienced, and untiring, became admirable instruments in the hands of the unprincipled propagandists, whose great effort seemed everywhere to break down all government, destroy all the bonds of society, and to produce, as rapidly as possible, a Pandemonium on earth. So artfully did they flatter the vanity, and minister to the pride of the inexperienced youths, that they found it but an easy task to convince them of their fitness to perform the first parts in the drama before them, and to utter the

leading voice in the reorganization of the state; and there was, consequently, from that period, no measure of the government which they did not feel themselves called upon to consider, and universally to condemn." Vol. i. pp. 116, 117.

"In a few weeks, Vienna was flooded with a most shameful literature. At every corner of the streets, and in all the public places, placards were stuck up for the perusal of those passing by, while boys and old men hawked about the streets the most licentious prints and pamphlets. These outrageous productions soon exercised the most baneful influence over the ignorant and already corrupt mob, instilling into them a poison, which they swallowed with the greater avidity, because it had so long been forbidden. The most unwarranted attacks were made upon the imperial family; the most high and honorable statesmen were, in placards, exposed to the vilest abuse, and the nobility and clergy to the utmost insult. The sanctity of private life and character was most shamefully evaded. Private differences became matters of public discussion, and the most solemn secrets of domestic life were published to the world. Every villain embraced the opportunity to inflict a stab in the dark, as it were, upon the man of irreproachable character, because he happened to be his enemy. In short, this liberty was soon changed into licentiousness, and this blessing into a curse.

"Many new newspapers appeared, which soon increased the number from three to one hundred; these were the weapons with which the designing operated. By these means the students were excited to a still greater degree of intolerance and madness; the *proletaria* were corrupted, and the citizens, eulogized as the vanguard of liberty throughout the Continent, became, for the most part, bewildered and extravagant both in their opinions and designs. The people, by these means, being thoroughly demoralized, violations of law and order soon commenced." Vol. i. pp. 117, 118.

Another extract shows the students in the light of practical reformers.

"The students began now to cultivate a most cordial intimacy with the lowest classes of the population. Declaring war against the nobility, clergy, military, and court; criticizing and censuring whatever of character and respectability existed among these classes of society, they became the flatterers of the mob; talked to the *proletaria* of their sacred rights, and of the liberty, equality, and fraternity of all classes of society; and, with the breath of adulation, instilled into their minds the poison of corruption. For the advancement of their purposes, and to give more extensive circulation to their baneful influence, numerous clubs were

now formed. Like that of the Jacobins at Paris, these clubs were the rendezvous of all the agitators. Here the masses received the first beams of enlightenment, and heard for the first time such words as liberty and sovereignty of the people; or, rather, were first taught practical definitions of those terms; that of the first, licentiousness; and of the second, anarchy. By a republic, they understood a total absence of all government. Each one, under such an administration, being a sovereign — the equal, in all respects, to the emperor; and their commands, whatever they might be, entitled equally to implicit obedience. Respect for the authority of the laws was a lesson which they were never taught." Vol. i. pp. 122, 123.

A few days after, the Emperor fled from his capital; the confusion and dismay of the rioters, at this unexpected result of their demonstrations, are well described. But we pass over this and other equally interesting topics, — the meeting of the deputies to form a constitution, and the interminable riots and alarms, to which the peaceful citizens were exposed from the insolence of the students and the workmen, — and all the other events of the revolution of March, to the painfully interesting chapter, in which the horrors of the 6th of October are recounted — a day forever memorable in the annals of revolutionary crime. Several important truths were demonstrated by these proceedings. "We wish no such Republic as you have in the United States," exclaimed one of the ablest of the radical leaders to Mr. Stiles; "we wish something original; we wish a government where there shall be not only an equality of rights and of rank, but an equality of property, and an equality of every thing." And another said, "Sir, the only course left to us is to raise the *guil-lotine*, and to keep it in constant and active operation; and our only watchword should be, *Blood! Blood! Blood!* and the more blood that flows, the sooner shall we attain our liberties." These were the atrocious sentiments too generally current among the reformers of those days; and the natural fruit of such sentiments, openly promulgated and warmly applauded, were the brutal murders of Prince Lichnowski, and Count Auerswald, at Frankfort; of Count Latour at Vienna; of Count Lamberg at Pesth; and of Count Rossi at Rome! It is an infamy to compare these revolutions with the war our fathers waged against the

armies of Great Britain. There is no more resemblance between them, than there is between the deeds of the midnight assassin, and the brave defence of the man who fights for his household hearth. The murder of Count Latour was one of the incidents in the second Revolution at Vienna, and is thus related.

"The tide of insurrection now rose to an unconquerable height. The nearest shots of the retiring cannons, the advancing shouts of the infuriated people, warned the ministers that all defence was rapidly becoming hopeless. The building itself still offered some means of resistance, and there were two cannons in the court; but at this crisis was issued a written order, signed by Latour and Wessenberg, "to cease the fire at all points," and given to officers for distribution.* It was in vain. The popular torrent rolled on towards the seat of government, which was destined ere long to be disgraced by atrocious crime. The Minister of War, Count Latour, prepared for defence. The military on guard in front of the War Office were withdrawn into the yard, with two pieces of artillery loaded with grape. The gates were closed, the military distributed to the different threatened points, and the cannons directed toward the two gates. Soon the scene of battle had reached the Bogner Gasse, immediately under the windows of the War Department; the ministers in consultation heard the cry, '*The military retreat.*' The great square of the Hof was soon cleared, the soldiers retiring by the way of the Freyung. The guards and Academic Legion pursuing, the military commander's quarters in the Freyung are soon captured. The retiring military, not being able to escape through the Schotten-Thor as they had expected—that gate being closed and barricaded—they cut their way through the *Herrn Gasse*.

"So intent were the respective combatants, either in retreat or pursuit, that the whole tempest of war swept over the Hof, and left that square for a short time deserted and silent.

* The last order issued by the unfortunate Latour was intrusted to Colonel Gustave Schindler, of the imperial engineers, an efficient officer, as well as a most amiable and accomplished gentleman, and one well and favorably known in the United States, from his kind attention to Americans who have visited the Austrian capital. The colonel was in the act of passing out of the great door of the War Office, which opens on to the Hof, when the mob reached that spot. Recognized by his imperial uniform, he was instantly surrounded and attacked. He received many blows over the head, inflicted by the crowd with clubs and iron bars; was most severely wounded, and would probably have been killed but for the timely interference of one of the rabble, who, riding up on horseback between the colonel and the mob, shielded him from further blows, and finally effected his escape.

“ But that stillness was of but short duration ; a few moments only had elapsed, when a number of straggling Guards, students and people, came stealing silently from the Graben, through the Bogner, Nagler, and Glocken Gasse, on to the Hof, and removed the dead and the wounded into the neighboring dwellings, and into the deserted guard-house in the War Department. These were soon followed by a fierce and noisy mob, armed with axes, pikes, and iron bars, which halted before the War Office, and began to thunder at its massive doors.

“ The officer of ordnance in vain attempted to communicate to the crowd the order of the ministry, that all firing should cease. A member of the Academic Legion, from the window over the gateway, waved with a white handkerchief to the tumultuous masses, and exhibiting the order signed by Latour and Wessenberg, read its contents to the crowd.

“ But a pacification was not to be thought of ; the people were too excited, their fury could only be appeased by blood ; that delayed measure was not sufficient ; they made negative gesticulations, and summoned the student to come down and open the portals to their admission. The tumult increased from minute to minute ; the closed doors at length gave way under the axes of the mob, and the people streamed in, led by a man ‘ in a light gray coat.’

“ The Secretary of War having by this time abandoned the idea of defence, on the ground either that it was useless or impolitic, no shots were fired or active resistance offered ; but the orderlies, with their horses, retired to the stables, and the grenadiers into an inner court. At first, only single individuals entered, and their course was not characterized by violence ; then groups, proceeding slowly, listening, and searching ; and, at last, the tumultuous masses thundered in the rear.

“ Ere long, the cry rung on the broad stair-case, ‘ Where is Latour ? he must die ! ’ At this moment, the ministers and their followers in the building, with the exception of Latour himself, found means to escape, or mingled with the throng. The deputies, Smolka, Borrosch, Goldmark, and Sierakowski, who had undertaken to guarantee protection to the threatened ministers, arrived in the hope of restraining the mob. The numerous corridors and cabinets of the War Office (formerly a monastery of Jesuits) were filled with the crowd ; the tide of insurrection now rose to an uncontrollable height ; and the danger of Latour became every moment more imminent. The generals who were with him, perceiving the peril, entreated him to throw himself upon the Nassau regiment, or the *Dutch Meister* grenadiers, and retreat to their barracks. He scorned the proposal, denied the danger, and even refused, for some time, to change his uniform

for a civilian's dress, until the hazard becoming more evident, he put on plain clothes, and went up into a small room in the roof of the building, where he soon after signed a paper declaring that, with his majesty's consent, he was ready to resign the office of Minister of War. A *Tecnicker*,* named Rauch, who, it was said, had come to relieve the Secretary of War, was seized and hung in the court by his own scarf, but fortunately cut down by a National Guard before life was extinct. The mob rushed into the private apartments of the minister, but plundered it merely of the papers, which were conveyed to the university. They came with a sterner purpose. The act of resignation, exhibited to the crowd by the Deputy Smolka, was scornfully received by the people, while the freshness of the writing, the sand adhering still to the ink, betrayed the proximity of the hand which had just traced it. Meanwhile, the crowd had penetrated the corridors of the fourth story, and were not long in discovering the place of Latour's concealment. Hearing their approach, and recognizing the voice of Smolka, vice-president of the Assembly, who was doubtless anxious to protect him, Latour came out of his retreat. They descended together from the fourth story by a narrow stairway, on the right-hand side of the building, and entered the yard by the pump. At each successive landing-place, the tumult and the crowd increased; but the descent was slow, and rendered more and more difficult by the numbers which joined the crowd at every turn of the stairs. At length they reached the court below, and Count Latour, although he had been severely pressed, was still unhurt; but here the populace, which awaited them, broke in upon the group that still clustered around Latour, and dispersed it. In vain did the deputies, Smolka and Sierakowski, endeavor to protect the minister; in vain did Count Leopold Gondrecourt attempt to cover him by the exposure of his own body. A workman struck the hat from his head; others pulled him by his gray locks — he defending himself with his hands, which were already bleeding. At length a ruffian, disguised as a Magyar, gave him, from behind, a mortal blow with a hammer, the man in the gray coat cleft his face with a sabre, and another plunged a bayonet into his heart. A hundred wounds followed, and, with the words, '*I die innocent!*' he gave up his loyal and manly spirit. A cry of exultation from the assembled crowd rent the air at this event. Every indignity was offered to his body; before he had ceased to breathe even, they hung him by a cord to the grating of a window in the court of the War Office. He had been suspended there but a few minutes when, from the outrages committed on it, the body fell." Vol. ii. pp. 98-101.

* A student of the Polytechnic School, for brevity, usually called *Tecnickers*.

The insurrection in Lombardy, the invasion of Charles Albert, the movements of Radetzky and Nugent, the final overthrow and the retreat of the ill-fated king, fill up, with varied interest, a series of animated chapters; but the history of the revolution in Venice, its brief triumph, its protracted and terrible siege and obstinate defence, with the final surrender, are more extraordinary and wonderful. After a brief summary of the history of Venice, down to the period under consideration, Mr. Stiles takes up the story of these startling events, in which the popular leader, orator, president, dictator, Daniel Manin, plays the most conspicuous part. This celebrated personage was born at Padua, in 1804; studied law, and was admitted at the age of 28 to the Venetian bar. In 1847, he began to agitate for reform, and so fell under the suspicions of the Austrian police. In January of 1848, he, with his compatriot, Niccolo Tomaseo, was thrown into prison. But when the revolutionary tide reached Venice, the release of these imprisoned martyrs was the first measure exacted by the populace from Count Palffy, the civil governor. The Austrians were taken by surprise, and completely paralyzed; the insurrection was successful; the popular demands were submitted to by the feeble and vacillating governor, and the life of the only man, Marinovich, who showed the least ability or energy, fell a sacrifice to the deliberate determination of the mob to shed his blood.

The audacity inspired by the first successes of the insurrection, and the unavenged murder of Marinovich, blinded the Venetians to the terrible fate that was lowering upon them at a distance, and slowly but surely drawing nigh. All propositions for conciliation were haughtily rejected; the republic was proclaimed, to flash like a meteor across the political sky, and to disappear as suddenly and as utterly. The last scenes of this strange eventful history, are thus described.

“Day after day, unceasingly, the cannonading continues; at many points the bombs set fire to the buildings, but these are soon extinguished without much injury; and as the balls seldom, if ever, penetrated further than the roof and one story, the population are unconcerned. Provisions become hourly more scarce: the supply can last but two weeks longer, and yet the people

very quietly say, 'We will hold out until we have nothing more to eat, and then the Croats may come and do what they please.'

"To add to the horrors of their situation, the cholera broke out among the inhabitants in its most dreadful and malignant form, its ravages, doubtless, increased by the scanty and unwholesome food upon which they had been for some time compelled to subsist; and yet, amid all these disasters, the city remained tranquil, the Place of St. Mark was as much frequented as ever, and the countenances of the Venetians as bright as though enjoying the sunshine of the palmiest days of the republic.

"On the 14th of August, Marshal Radetzky, aware of the state to which the city was reduced, renewed his efforts to induce it to capitulate, by offering nearly the same terms that had been previously rejected. Strange that now, when ammunition, food, medicine, drink, even water was failing — when to the general misery and squalor the cholera is added, carrying off from eighty to one hundred a day, in Venice and Chioggia, families without bread, without a roof, in search of shelter and victuals, old men, women, and children crammed into the public store-houses, or under the naked sky exposed to all the inclemencies of the weather and all the bombs and balls of the Austrians, these terms, quite as moderate as could possibly have been expected, were again rejected.

"On the 17th, the president of the republic, warned by the rapid progress of public danger that longer resistance was impossible, in consultation with the commandant of the French squadron and the French consul, it was decided, as the only and last means of safety, to send a Venetian deputation to the Austrian camp with an offer of capitulation. General Gergowski, commander of the Austrian troops before Venice, received the deputation on the 19th; and, in reply to their application, stated that he had no power to treat, but that he would immediately forward their note to Milan, and that, during the time necessary to receive a reply from Marshal Radetzky, he would consent to slacken his fire on the city; and further, that Venice might confide in the paternal intentions of the emperor, and in the enlightened and liberal spirit of his government. The deputation, comprehending the exact value to be attached to such phrases, returned dejected and disconsolate to Venice.

"Time rolls on, the reply from Milan is hourly expected, the destiny of a nation hangs on the balance, and a day becomes an age. The fire of the enemy, somewhat slackened on the 20th and 21st, is renewed on the night of the latter with as great severity as ever. What will be the nature of the reply from Milan? What terms will an all-powerful and long-provoked enemy inflict upon an utterly weak and prostrate foe?

"No one knows, but all fear they will be rigorous in the ex-

treme. The republic approaches its end. Venice has but two days' provisions left, and those of the worst kind. The progress of the cholera is frightful. The absolute and unconditional surrender of the city within two days, inevitable. The 22d of August arrives, and with it the answer of the field-marshal. That octogenarian commander, as magnanimous as renowned, has affixed no additional stipulations on his fallen foe; the terms are accepted by the municipality of Venice, in whose favor the Provisional Government and the National Assembly have abdicated their powers; the firing has ceased on both sides, and the republic of Venice is no more." Vol. i. pp. 338, 339.

The next subject in order is some account of the Sclavonian races, introductory to the story of the revolutionary movements in Bohemia, the outbreak in Prague, and the bombardment of that city; and the first volume closes with a sketch of the Panславist theories, which have occupied so much of the attention of the European world during the last twenty years.

The text of the second volume is chiefly occupied with Hungarian affairs, and an appendix containing a series of documents, of great importance, as illustrating the history of the period in discussion. One chapter, from which we have already taken an extract, is devoted to the second Revolution in Vienna; and another, to the conclusion of the war between the Austrians and Charles Albert. A brief sketch of the early history of Hungary is prefixed to the details of the disastrous revolutionary movements of 1848.

The Magyars, separated by race, language, and institutions from the surrounding tribes, among whom they had thrust themselves, had early founded a kingdom, which maintained its independence until 1526, when it placed itself under the protection of the Austrian crown, by electing Ferdinand king of Hungary. The constitution of Hungary embraced all the worst principles of feudalism, so far as concerns the relations between the peasants and their masters; but the succession to the Hungarian crown was elective, and continued to be so, until it was made hereditary in the House of Hapsburg, in 1687. But the Emperor, though from this time forward the hereditary successor to the Hungarian crown, received it under rigid conditions, as an independent and constitutional

sovereignty, the ancient laws and rights of which the monarch bound himself, by the coronation oath and the diploma of inauguration, to preserve inviolate. In 1723, the succession was still farther modified by the Pragmatic Sanction, by being made hereditary in the female as well as the male line. It does not appear that the Pragmatic Sanction changed the relations between Austria and Hungary in any other respect; the monarch was still bound to administer the government according to the ancient constitution, and wholly without reference to his hereditary Austrian possessions.

The old Hungarian constitution has been sufficiently discussed in former numbers of this Journal; and to go over the ground again would be only a repetition of what has been said before. It is sufficient to say that it was entirely unsuited to the advanced state of political knowledge in our age, and needed careful and judicious reforms, in almost every department. Its gross and glaring oppression of the lower classes, and the unjust privileges it bestowed on the higher, were equally injurious to the oppressor and oppressed; for it is a law of political retribution, that the tyrant, while he inflicts harm upon the victims of his usurped power, can never escape the penalty of an avenging Nemesis in his own person. The Hungarians, at the beginning of the present century, were greatly behind all the nations of Europe in the essential elements of civilization; the nobles, as a class, were as much below the upper classes in other countries, in education, intellectual culture, and political knowledge, as the peasants were below the peasantry of other countries in political rights.

The government was administered, as is well known, chiefly through the Hungarian Chancery in Vienna, and the Palatine, who represented the monarch, with a council of twenty-two members, nominated by the crown, resident at Buda. The legislative power was vested in a Diet, which, originating in the armed assembly of the Hungarian nation, finally assumed the form of a parliament, consisting of two Chambers or Tables, the first consisting of the higher clergy, the barons and counts of the kingdom, and the magnates; the second, or Lower House, consisting of deputies from the comitats, the free cities and

towns. The Upper House was hereditary, and contained, in all, six or seven hundred members, of whom only thirty or forty usually attended. The Lower House embraced about two hundred and fifty. Even this slight sketch of the departments of the Hungarian constitution, in its political aspect alone, is enough to show the incongruity of its union with the absolutism of Austria. However strongly the privileges of the kingdom were guarded by compacts, and oaths, and inaugurations, it was hardly in the nature of things that the maxims and policy of Austria should not, in the course of time, overweigh, with a tremendous inclination of the scale, the opposite tendencies of the constitution. The necessity of protection first called in the powerful house of Hapsburg to assume the royal authority in Hungary; a political necessity, the force of which rises almost to the uniform character of a law of nature, drove the Austrian into attempts to consolidate his new and restricted acquisition with his inherited and absolute possessions. This was the fact historically, from the first moment of the union of the two crowns upon a single head. The transfer of so large a part of the administration to Vienna was a long stride towards the overthrow of the constitution; and the attempts, some of which were successful, on the part of the monarchs, to evade their constitutional obligations by refusing to take the oaths, and undergo the ceremony of coronation, according to the ancient usages of the realm, were clear indications of the political gravitation which was slowly bringing the kingdom into the position of a component part of the Austrian empire. Many of the Hungarian aristocracy belonged rather to the court circles of Vienna, than to the proud rank of territorial barons, holding their princely courts in their impregnable castles. The Magyars, from the beginning, were a military race; and many of the bravest and best of their high-spirited nobility were distinguished officers in the Imperial armies, owing allegiance directly to the Emperor of Austria, and not to the king of Hungary. On this point of official allegiance, the distinction between that due to the sovereign as king, and that due to him as emperor, was practically reduced to a shadow. It was only an historical remembrance, and

not a vital, present thing. It is true, there was, at times, a vigorous opposition to the encroachments of Austria, especially among the Magyars, in the Diet; but on the whole, there prevailed an undistinguishing feeling of enthusiastic loyalty to the House of Hapsburg, as the ancient and rightful sovereigns of Hungary; and the terrible oppression of the Hungarian constitution, the irresponsible powers of the nobility over a subjugated and enslaved people, lost the Magyars the support of the multitude in their contests with the Austrian crown.

The operation was still further complicated by the subordinate relations between the different races, which made up the kingdom of Hungary, and the ancient and ineradicable hatred between them. The Magyars were the predominant race, to whom the Slaves, Croats, Wallachians, and Germans bore the fiercest hostility; and the feuds between these nationalities have always been a sad comment on the small chance there has been of establishing an effective "solidarity of the peoples." These divisions, irreconcilable because founded on distinctions of race, weakened the means of opposition to the centralizing policy of Austria, and strengthened, in the same proportion, the hands of the imperialists. In short, it was the old fable of the horse and his rider, over again; the man who had been allowed to mount, during the time of danger, kept his seat and subdued the noble animal to obedience by bit and spur, after the danger was over. But the happiness of the great body of the people was not injuriously affected, by this transfer of power. On the contrary, the Austrian influence, on the whole, bettered their condition. It was a contest between absolute monarchy and an odious oligarchy; in such a contest, the crown is always the friend to popular rights, and the people rally round the throne against their petty oppressors. It was absurd, indeed, to expect an absolute king to favor the pretensions of a proud and independent aristocracy; and still more absurd to expect one and the same prince, to be a despot in his hereditary dominions, and a limited and constitutional ruler in a bordering state. The consequences of this incompatibility of functions followed naturally and inevitably, in spite of an-

cient usages and historical rights; not by open and violent proceedings, for the most part, but by those subtle and secret processes and influences, which a wealthy and powerful despotism knows how to wield for its purposes. Had the old constitution remained, humanity would have found nothing to regret in the entire success of the Austrian scheme to incorporate Hungary into the Empire, and to blend the administration of Hungary with that of the other component parts into a united system of government.

But the opposition to Austria, or the patriotic party, combined in itself two elements; one, conservative of Hungarian institutions as they were, as against Austrian encroachment; another, equally opposed to Austrian encroachment, but also eager to introduce radical reforms into the constitution of the kingdom, thus adapting it to the wants of the age, and to a more enlightened political system; both, however, contemplating the preservation of the monarchical form, and of the union under the crown of Austria. A third element, but more secret in its manifestations, was the republican or democratic, which looked forward hopefully to the entire overthrow of aristocracy and monarchy, and to the establishment of a government upon the principle of the absolute equality of all mankind. The party which represented this third element was numerically very small, and, as Pulsky says, it had little or no influence in the country. It is probable that neither of the parties, in whom these principles were embodied, distinctly saw the ends at which they were aiming. Those who struggled merely to keep alive the oppressive system of the old constitution against the attacks of Austria, — to secure their own unjust privileges against the usurpations of another tyranny, entitled themselves to no sympathy on the part of the enlightened lovers of liberty; those who strove to maintain the historical rights of the nation, and at the same time to temper the institutions of the country according to principles of equal justice and the demands of a cultivated age, are deserving of the commendation of good men everywhere, and history will proclaim their merits in her imperishable records. Whether the projects of the republican schemers were worthy of approbation, depends on the question

whether, in the first place, the nation, in its collective capacity was fitted to receive and administer republican institutions; whether it desired them, as of choice; whether, supposing it was fitted for them, and desired them, it was capable of maintaining them, surrounded, as they would be, by great and powerful nations, to which they would be objects of suspicion and constant hostility; in fine, whether such institutions were suited to produce, in that country, and in the present state of the world, the greatest possible amount of human happiness and national prosperity. A negative answer to these questions would be a condemnation of this party; not of their motives, but of their wisdom and judgment.

The condition of Hungary was greatly improved by the policy of another party still, of whom Count Stephen Széchenyi may be considered the representative and head. The patriotic services of this enlightened and distinguished nobleman have already been fully discussed in this Review. Alas! that the rashness or incompetency of those who displaced and succeeded him, should have arrested the safe, and prosperous, and constitutional career, upon which, under his auspices, the country had entered!

The most important political changes accomplished previous to the late war, by the combined efforts of the liberals, were,—1. The emancipation of the peasantry. 2. The equal distribution of the public burdens among all the citizens. 3. Civil equality, and the participation of all classes in legislative and political power, with some other provisions for the removal of disabilities, the security of property, and the equal administration of justice. All these measures would have been worthy of unqualified commendation, had they been taken with caution, and if the evil consequences of sudden and extensive changes had been sufficiently guarded against. But this degree of wisdom was found to be wanting in the Hungarian legislators. The rights of the proprietors, seriously affected by the liberation of the peasants from their customary dues, were, in effect, though probably not in intention, sacrificed to the passion of the hour. "The landlords," says Mr. Stiles, in his able analysis of these proceedings, "are to receive an indemnification, rather vaguely expressed by a high-flown Magyar phrase, namely,

‘The Legislature places the indemnification of the landed proprietors under the protecting shield of the national honor.’” The convulsions that followed immediately upon the outbreak of 1848 broke in pieces “the protecting shield of the national honor,” and left the landed proprietors despoiled of one half their property. Kossuth had sketched the outlines of a practical scheme for adjusting the conflicting interests of the different parties. But the mistake was committed in not having matured it in all its details, and incorporated it in the legislative act by which the complete emancipation of the peasant — a noble sacrifice to the rights of man, and worthy of an everlasting place in history — was finally consummated. These were not all accomplished without the aid of the impulse from without, imparted by the Revolution at Paris in 1848, which, by the terror and confusion it wrought everywhere on the Continent, so deeply affected the condition of every European nation. The steps taken by the political leaders in Hungary are matters of history; the most important measure secured by them was the appointment of a Hungarian ministry, with Count Louis Batthiányi at its head, through whom the Executive power was to be exclusively exercised; thus putting an end to the system of the Chancery at Vienna. This concession was of the first importance; and had the nation been well prepared for the vast political changes, urged on with such breathless rapidity, the new administration would have been the source of lasting and inappreciable blessings to a generous people. But the nation was not prepared; the peasants were not able to bear the light of liberty by which their eyes were suddenly dazzled. Mr. Stiles points out, briefly but strikingly, some of the dangers and disasters into which hasty emancipation led the country.

“The ameliorations which had been effected produced the utmost satisfaction throughout the kingdom; but this bright day in Hungarian history was of short duration.

“In the first place, the change was too sudden, from the restraints of a rigid government to the enjoyment of constitutional liberty, and the people,* with no knowledge or experience of rational freedom, gave way to the utmost license; while the new government, scarcely organized, was too feeble to check their

* “The masses, who previously enjoyed no privileges.”

excesses, or afford protection to the persons and property of the more peaceful inhabitants.

“Demonstrations, consequently, occurred in various portions of the kingdom, which would have disgraced the barbarism of the darker ages, and could not have been looked for in the nineteenth century in any portion of the civilized globe.

“In the Eisenburger comitat, an attack was made by the mob upon the Jews, plundering and maltreating this unfortunate race without cause, and only for the gratification of a national antipathy. In the Szatmar comitat, the poor landlords rose against the rich ones, and, equally without reason, slaughtered the nobles and destroyed their princely dwellings. In Middle Szolnok, so weak were the authorities, that a sworn jury fell victims to the popular rage. At Chemnitz, and in its neighborhood, the Slavie national fanaticism became daily more dangerous. At Neusatz, the mob took down the Hungarian flag and burned it, and then raised a red one in its place; at the same time, they seized the first fiscal officer of the town, brought him into the market-place, and there cut him literally in pieces. At Kikinda, and other points, outrages occurred too horrible to relate. These isolated atrocities of the mob could easily have been quelled by the presence of an efficient military force; but at that time, the number of regular troops throughout the whole kingdom did not exceed eighteen thousand men. Repeatedly did the Hungarian ministry appeal to the Austrian government for assistance to suppress this anarchy; and it was only after these urgent and repeated applications had been attended with no success, that the first threats of separation escaped the nation.” Vol. ii. 56, 57.

In the next place, the old enmity of races, scarcely held in check before, now burst forth with terrible effect. The rights of the nationalities composing, by an ill-compacted union, one kingdom, were fiercely asserted, the moment the common authority of Austria was partially set aside. “It was the great error of the Hungarians,” says Mr. Stiles, “and the rock upon which their bark of state was wrecked, that, while they were struggling with the imperial government for the establishment of their own nationality, they were reluctant altogether to respect the nationality of those provinces which lay within their borders.” This error, it is true, they afterwards endeavored to correct; but only when it was too late. Previously to this, another question had been debated in the Diet, with no little violence. In earlier times, the official language of Hungary was the Latin. However

inconvenient and absurd the custom of employing an ancient language in the transaction of the affairs of a modern nation might be, it had, at least, the merit of giving equal rights to all the nationalities. It was a clumsy and inconvenient contrivance, but equally clumsy to Sclavonian, Croatian, and Magyar. It was a judicious step to do it away; but which of the numerous languages spoken in Hungary to substitute for it, was a difficult and delicate problem to solve. The Magyars suddenly became proud of their native tongue, which, according to the magniloquent boast of one of their patriots, they brought with them from the Himmalaya. In point of fact, it is a language resembling in its structure those of middle and northern Asia, whence the Magyars migrated in the ninth century. It has no affinities with the Indo-European languages, either in its lexicon or its grammatical structure; and it belongs to a lower type, called, by comparative philologists, the agglutinating. It has never been the organ of a comprehensive civilization, like the German, and other European languages, and, in this respect, is even inferior to the Sclavonic dialects. The educated Magyars, universally, are trained in German or French, or both, as well as, to some extent, in the ancient classics. Yet the Magyar is undoubtedly a copious and powerful language, and capable of being made the instrument of a rich national poesy, of a very different form and spirit, however, from either the Teutonic or Romanic culture of Middle and Southern Europe. It is decidedly oriental in its turn of expression, as the genuine Magyar mind is oriental in its cast of thought. That it is capable of being moulded to the forms of a high and beautiful eloquence, Kossuth has demonstrated beyond a doubt. Yet it would seem, that, if one language was to have the precedence over the rest, it would have been more judicious to select that by which the national mind might have connected itself most directly with the highest civilization of the age. But this is only a theoretical view. The practical course, evidently, was to leave all the languages on a perfect equality, however great the inconvenience might have been, and even had it been logically demonstrable that ultimately it was for the interests of Hungary that the Magyar should displace every other.

In this way, the old jealousies of Magyar encroachment would have been wholly prevented, and one of the main causes of the war of races, which deluged the country in blood, and gave Austria an opportunity of interfering with the strong hand, would never have existed.

The defence set up by the Magyar party, especially in this country, that the establishment of the supremacy of one language was a necessity, and that it had its parallel in the establishment of the English language in the United States, is a fallacy. There is no analogy between the two cases at all. The United States are, from the beginning, an English race. Emigrants of other races, and other languages, it is true, crowd hither, in vast numbers; but they come, and they have always come, as individuals, as future citizens of the United States, conforming to an order of things long existing, and not proposing to form separate nationalities, to be represented as such in the national confederacy. The question of language never can be raised, under such circumstances, because the question of nationality never can be raised. We are not a congeries of nations and tribes, united in a confederacy, but we are all of one nation — citizens of the United States. The case requires only to be stated, that the absurdity of the argument may clearly manifest itself. There is not the shadow of a resemblance between the position of the English language in the United States, and that of the Magyar language in Hungary. Had the matter been left to take its natural course, it is probable enough, that, in the course of time, the Magyar would have silently worked its way to the preëminence which was arrogantly asserted for it at the outset; but the claims of its advocates, notwithstanding the important concessions they made to the Slaves and Croatsians, still maintained such a superiority of position, that the self-respect and national pride of the other races were intensely excited, and to this cause much of the ferocity of the war they waged against the government of Kossuth must be attributed. Mr. Stiles forcibly says, "Instead of increasing by these measures the hostility of the neighboring provinces, had the Hungarian ministers taken the necessary steps to appease that feeling, and, by respecting their different nationalities, have secured their confidence

and support, they would have united in their cause a force which would, in defence of their soil, and with the peculiar advantages of the country for their mode of warfare, have been perhaps invincible by any armies which Austria, either alone, or when aided by Russia, could bring against them. The population of Hungary and its provinces, is estimated at about fourteen millions; *of this number, a little over five millions only are Magyars, and the remainder, (nearly nine millions,) instead of battling with them, were, by the course of the Hungarian Diet and Ministry, driven into the ranks of their opponents."*

We must, therefore, agree with Mr. Stiles in considering this agitation of the question of language, a fatal error of the ultra Magyar party. The debate on this subject, in the Diet of 1847-48, of which Mr. Stiles furnishes an interesting analysis, gave significant warning of the consequences which would probably follow. The issue between the Magyar and Slavonic principles was distinctly joined. The speeches of Ossegovich, the Croatian delegate in the Lower House, and of the Slavonian delegates, and those of Haulik and Busan in the Upper House, exhibited the sensitiveness to which the Magyar pretensions had given birth, not only in the popular feeling, but in the minds of the most enlightened men of the respective races.

The reform, however, in the main seemed to advance with prosperous gales. The Emperor had not only signed the various reform bills which had passed the Diet, but he had yielded the point of an independent ministry; and there was no apparent reason why the kingdom of Hungary should not go on in a rapid and successful career of material and political improvement. The cabinet consisted of the most eminent men of the liberal party, — men in whom the country reposed almost unlimited confidence. The only dangers that threatened the final success of this grand movement, arose from the want of preparation among the people for the full measure of liberty meted out to them by the reformers, from the hot haste with which radical changes were making, from the discord of races and nationalities, and from the certainty that the Imperial government would return, as far as possible and as soon as possible, to the old despotic principles; that as soon as

the effervescence of the revolutionary spirit had somewhat subsided, a reactionary tendency would succeed it, and every means would be employed to restore, if not the ancient order of things, at least the ancient power of the Imperial Court. The excesses of the revolution in Vienna, and the manifest incompetency of the popular leaders, gave only too good an excuse to the supporters of despotism; and the ill-adjusted relations of Hungary, the immediate consequences of the emancipation of the peasants, together with the horrible murder of Count Lamberg, which the Hungarian government unwisely and wickedly suffered to pass unpunished, with only a few faint words of regret for the atrocity, gave a similar excuse to the imperialists, to revoke, at the earliest practicable moment, the extorted concessions, and to treat Hungary as a revolted province. The contest soon began in good earnest, and rapidly matured into a struggle for life and death. The state of things in Hungary required the calmest and most sagacious statesmanship; instead of this, rash and heady counsels prevailed, and all was lost.

It is not our purpose to follow the fortunes of unhappy Hungary minutely through the many-colored events of the short and sharp struggle which ended in her downfall. Mr. Stiles has given a luminous, and generally an impartial account. It is asserted, by the uncompromising supporters of the Magyar cause, that the war between the Croats and Hungarians was stirred up by the intrigues of Austria, and Mr. Stiles appears to adopt this view of the case. But we think the facts and illustrations which he gives of the hostility of races directly contradict this assertion, in its absolute form. The seeds of the war had already been planted by the Magyars themselves, in a soil fully prepared to receive them. No doubt, the Imperial government stood ready to avail itself of every advantage the distracted state of the country held out; no doubt, the Austrians slighted the obligations they had taken upon themselves in the time of distress, just as soon as the turning current of events placed them in a position to retrieve what they had been compelled to surrender. To this extent, the charge of bad faith justly lies at the door of the Austrian government; but the opportunity to break their faith was insensibly given them

by the incredible rashness of their opponents. The double-dealing of Austria, in first denouncing the Ban Jellachich as a traitor for his attack on Hungary, even pretending to depose him from all his dignities and to summon him into the Imperial presence, apparently intending to bring him to a traitor's doom, and afterwards sanctioning his movements, and finally giving him open support, making him one of the instruments of the subjection of Hungary, is a striking example of royal duplicity. We agree entirely in the condemnation passed upon these acts by Mr. Stiles. All that can be said in their justification is, that the apparent yielding to the urgency of the Hungarian ministry, headed by the Palatine himself, was a reluctant concession, made while the Emperor was under a kind of duress; and by the Jesuitical reasoning of despotic morals, promises so made are of no binding effect. It may also be urged, that radical and dangerous tendencies were rapidly developing themselves, and that, to secure the empire from anarchy and dissolution, no other way was left than to retrace the path of concession the first moment the probability of success dawned amidst the revolutionary storm. However this may be, the deed was done, and Austria stood before the world, stained in the public opinion with the crimes of duplicity and perjury,—her only defence, the supposed necessity of recovering her ancient despotic sway. She had yielded to the tempest, because she could not withstand its violence; when the tempest had spent its force, she sprang back again, and stood up as absolute as ever.

The appointment of Count Lamberg, pronounced by the Hungarian Diet unconstitutional, the brutal murder of that unfortunate nobleman, the nomination of Recsey as President of the Hungarian ministry, the attempted dissolution of the Diet, the appointment of Jellachich Royal Commissioner,—all of which were resisted as unconstitutional, brought affairs to a crisis. The moderate members of the former ministry, and others, “who had, up to this time, supported all the measures of the movement party,” such as Louis Batthányi, Deak, Széchényi and Wesselenyi, “alarmed at the violence of the Diet,” says Mr. Stiles, “indignant at the murder of Count Lamberg, and fearful that Kossuth was hurrying

the country into revolution, withdrew altogether from the struggle. They were advocates for reform, they were not yet ready for rebellion. Kossuth, on the other hand, deprived of this conservative portion of his party, was compelled to seek support from, and consequently to fall under the influence of, the more anarchical faction." These sentences furnish the key to the history of all the subsequent disasters of Hungary.*

The two most prominent names henceforth, in the brief and bloody annals of the war, are Kossuth and Arthur Görgey. Kossuth has been compared to Washington, by some people more enthusiastic than wise. It would be impossible to imagine a more infelicitous comparison; scarcely a single point of resemblance between the characters and careers of the two men can be alleged to justify it. Washington passed an unstained youth, in

* It is worth while to look, for a moment, at the judgment which was formed of Kossuth's conduct by his own colleagues in the ministry. Casimir Batthiányi, his Minister for Foreign Affairs down to the end of the war, writes thus: — "Ambition and a hankering after notoriety, and the suppleness with which he always yielded to the most pressing and least scrupulous, placed him first in contradiction with himself, and then involved him — and it may be said, also, the other ministers — in an inconsistent policy, and finally led him to the self-willed and arbitrary measures which accelerated the fall of the [Louis] Batthiányi ministry. It is unnecessary to charge a man with more failings and follies than he has been guilty of. Kossuth has already enough to answer for before the tribunal of public opinion respecting his political conduct, *which was unquestionably the main cause of the ruin and downfall of his country.*"

"I am also of opinion," Batthiányi adds, "that, so far from following a sound policy in wishing, as he does, to remodel the reformed Constitution of 1848, and engraft on it principles of republicanism and unleavened democracy, — *principles which are at variance with our national laws and institutions, as well as with the manners, customs, and genius of the people,* — he would have acted more wisely, and rendered a more essential service to his country, if, after his liberation from the thralldom of detention, he had appeared before the world in the simple character of a private individual."

The opinion of Prince Esterhazy, a member of the first reform ministry under Louis Batthiányi, is, as might be expected, still more severe. "This result [the Hungarian catastrophe] of the proceedings of which he was at once the moving power and the instrument, the frequent difference between his words and his deeds, and his reluctance to act manfully in case of need, have now, I think, blotted out, among the majority of the nation, the phantasmagoria of his unpropitious influence. To that the last blow was given, when, seeing the end of his ephemeral power fast approaching, he resorted to republican Utopias, more intended, I apprehend, for exportation to foreign markets than for home consumption in our own, as I can hardly think him capable of such an egregious mistake as to indulge the hope of making such a scheme palatable to a population, *whose genius, traditional history, feelings, and habits are so eminently monarchical and aristocratic.*"

severe and manly toils, which fitted his mind and body for the endurance of his after life; Kossuth did not. Washington always exercised the sternest self-control; Kossuth did not. Washington was eminently cool, cautious, reflective in council; Kossuth was not. Washington, having had long military experience, was called by the deliberate voice of Congress to the command-in-chief of the armies; Kossuth had no military experience, never led an army, and appeared on the field only to harangue the troops. Washington sustained the drooping fortunes of the country, through a seven years' war, sharing all the hazards of the strife, never despairing of the republic, never shrinking from any duty, constant under every discouragement, patient under every provocation, vigilant, severe, firm, in the end triumphant; approving himself a commander equal to any exigence of war; then more glorious still, a civil ruler equal to every emergency of an inexperienced republic, lending the powerful aid of his wisdom to build a government for the country his valor had redeemed; presiding over the new-formed government with a godlike sagacity and wisdom; retiring to private life, with the modesty of an unpretending citizen, from a station more exalted than the thrones of kings, with a fame more enduring than that of any sage or conqueror, whose thoughts and deeds have most illustrated the history of the human race. What is there in Kossuth's case to match these matchless perfections of our Washington?

But it does not follow, because his admirers have made a tasteless and absurd comparison, that Kossuth is not, in his way, a very distinguished man. We admit the propriety of Mr. Webster's application to him of the epithet "illustrious," the Chevalier Hülsemann to the contrary notwithstanding. Kossuth has undoubtedly shown, from an early period of his life, very extraordinary qualities, and the richest gifts of genius; but not the balanced character of Washington. He is oriental in the cast of his mind; of a poetical and impassioned nature. He understands well how to address his imaginative countrymen, so as to raise an irresistible storm of enthusiasm, for the moment. His highly figurative style of speech — wholly beyond the limits of a sober and cul-

tivated taste, as it is — was well suited to the brilliant and somewhat fantastic Magyar. In his numerous appeals to his people, during the war, he employed, with consummate mastery, all the wordy weapons in his inexhaustible armory. Sometimes, in oriental fashion, he spoke to them as a patriarch speaks to his children; sometimes, he assumed the lofty tone of a Hebrew prophet, and denounced the vengeance of the Lord on the wicked invaders of his country; then he changed his hand, and predicted, like the Psalmist of Israel, the triumph of the hosts of Hungary. The denunciations and predictions were alike fallacious; yet his believing children put their trust in him, as in a being supernaturally endowed. He is a great parliamentary orator, with powers almost unrivalled to agitate the passions and lead the judgment of a legislative assembly. His power over a popular body is marvellous; and the most marvellous part of the whole story is, that his power, great as it was over the multitudes of his countrymen, is hardly diminished by the difficulty of addressing strangers in a foreign language. The triumphs of his eloquence in England and the United States form a memorable epoch in the history of both. Having learned the language, with Shakspeare for a master, and an Austrian dungeon for a school-house, he appears before immense assemblies, and seems to move their hearts at will, by the strange enchantment of his discourse. The effect is aided by the peculiarity of his position, the picturesqueness of his costume, which he adjusts with an eye for artistic effect, by the low and wailing tone of his voice, by the sadness of his sable garb and waving plume, by the Eastern honors of his unshorn countenance, by the burden of sorrow with which his soul is overlaid. His voice is not powerful, but it is so clear and neat, that his words reach the farthest limit of the largest and most crowded assembly; and when he rises, in attitudes of studied and pictorial woe, to plead, an exile, the cause of his fallen country, the most obstinate prejudice relents, the sternest logic yields to the magic of the hour.

With all this poetry and art, contrast the austere simplicity of Washington, whose speech was always brief, and to the point; who influenced men by the clearness of

his statements, the severity of his passionless manner, the force of his common sense, and above all, by the weight of his character. He spoke to the reason, seldom to the feelings, never to the passions. He relied on the conviction of the understanding of his hearers, not on the eloquence of his own words.

We think the mistakes of Kossuth, as a statesman, may be traced directly to his eminent qualities as an agitator, the inspiration of which carried him, as well as others, irresistibly away. He was animated by the great ideas, which belong to the philanthropy and higher civilization of the age. His soul kindled with a poetico-religious fervor; he saw visions and he dreamed dreams; and with all this, he showed the most indefatigable industry and considerable administrative ability. Until the trial came, his genius swept all before it; when the crisis arrived, the dream dissolved, the visions fled away, the prophecies were falsified, the great ideas of the "*Solidarity of the nations*," which were to turn the points of Austrian bayonets, to arrest the flight of Austrian cannon-shot, to array England, France, the United States, and Turkey, in fraternal arms, on the side of Hungary, and to extort the acknowledgment of her independence from her oppressor, "like an unsubstantial pageant, faded" into the phantom visitants of an enthusiastic brain.

We believe Kossuth was an honest and patriotic defender of his country; but he was rash and self-deceived. He placed too much reliance on the enthusiasm which his speech and his personal qualities excited; he was no statesman, in the highest meaning of that term. In untroubled times, the loftiest professional and parliamentary fame would have been easily achieved by him; the most brilliant literary distinction was within his easy grasp. But he fell on evil and troubled times. He overrated his strength, and mistook his vocation. He vainly dreamed he could ride the whirlwind and direct the storm; but he became its victim. He fell — *magnis excidit ausis* — and carried his country with him in that stupendous fall, — *dignus imperio nisi imperasset*. The weakness of his character went with him into prison and exile. His surrender of power was as disastrous to him, as his assumption of it was rash; his flight into Turkey was a great

escape, and a greater misfortune. He should have stood to his post, and shared the extremities of fate, as he had the dizzy glories of power. He had spoken grandly; he should have acted bravely. Had he died with the death of his country's liberty, his errors would have been forgotten in the blaze of his patriotic renown, and his name would have been a rallying word forever. No man draws a second chance from the wheel of fortune. Kossuth has had his, and it was a splendid one; his career was open, the race was before him; but he lost the prize, and the book of his destiny is closed forever.

His visit to the United States was an interesting appendix; but it has turned out a sad mistake. Again the weakness of his character blinded him, and changed what might have been a beautiful and soothing expression of heartfelt sympathy for an illustrious and unfortunate exile, into a tumultuous succession of noisy plaudits — the senseless shouts of mobs; the more senseless adorations of weak-minded enthusiasts; and the most senseless extravagance of costly banquets, in the drunken excitement of which, American citizens forgot their country, ministers of the gospel forgot their mission to preach the doctrines of peace, and adopted the thrasonical tone of bullies and braggarts, to the dishonor of their profession, and the deep mortification of every man of sense in the country. From the foolish boast of two hundred thousand bayonets, which saluted Kossuth on his arrival, to the promises of national intervention made by popularity-hunting politicians, seeking to trim their sails to the shifting gales, — the whole exhibition was tasteless and senseless; it excited the wonder of other nations, and, while it made the judicious friends of our country grieve, it exposed us to the inextinguishable laughter of the world.

Kossuth's course was wrong from the beginning. His demeanor on board the ship, sent by the liberality of our government to convey him from a Turkish prison to our shores, was foolish and insulting to the officers; and American citizens have been found base enough to uphold him in it, careless of the honor of the flag which he did his best to compromise. The common sense of the country has decisively pronounced, that the orders of the service are right, and that the officers only did their

duty in enforcing them. Kossuth ventured to criticize and condemn them; but he should have remembered that, without such regulations, no American ship of war could have proceeded to the coast of Asia Minor, on its errand of mercy and charity in his behalf. Kossuth ventured to taunt us with the reproach that we have not yet taken our place among the nations of the earth. How, then, did we rescue him from his long imprisonment, if our influence is so contemptible as he would have the world believe? How is it, that exiles from every kingdom and nation flee hitherward, as to an invincible refuge and sanctuary? How is it, that his own countrymen shelter themselves under the ample folds of the banner of the Union, and find here the peace, the freedom, the happiness they lost at home? How is it, that when famine strikes a nation with death, our ships of war bear the fruits of our abundant harvests to strengthen the exhausted frames of millions, and to bring up departing life to the wretched, starving multitudes? How is it, that our commerce whitens every sea? that our government stands unshaken, when ancient monarchies topple down, and grows stronger as their strength declines? How is it, if we are so little thought of in the political world, that Kossuth expends all the resources of his eloquence to convince the people, that the simple expression of our opinion will hold the mighty Czar of all the Russias in check, when he gathers his myriads to crush the rising spirit of Hungary a second time?

The terms on which Kossuth was released by the Sultan are clearly implied in Mr. Webster's masterly letter to the American Minister on the subject. We quote the paragraph most essential to a correct judgment on the question.

"It is now more than a year since the last Hungarian army surrendered, and the attempt at revolution and the establishment of an independent government, in which they were engaged, was most sternly crushed by the united forces of two of the greatest powers of Europe. Their chief associates are, like themselves, in exile, or have perished on the field, or on the scaffold, or by military execution. Their estates are confiscated, their families dispersed, and every castle, fortress, and city of Hungary is in the possession of the forces of Austria.

"They themselves, by their desire to remove so far from the

scene of their late conflict, declare that they entertain no hope or thought of other similar attempts, and wish only to be permitted to withdraw themselves altogether from all European association, and seek new homes in the vast regions of the United States." *Webster's Works*, Vol. vi. pp. 593, 594.

Mr. Webster used this argument in good faith; it was listened to by the Turkish government in good faith. Had Kossuth's course in the United States been foreseen, Mr. Webster could not have asked for his release, and the Turk would not have granted it, if he had.

Now, in our opinion, Kossuth bound himself, by accepting the release, to observe the conditions, whether expressed or implied, on which the United States obtained it. Good faith to the generous Turk required it. Good faith to this country required it. The obvious consequence of setting these considerations at naught, is that it compromises this country with Turkey, and Turkey with Russia and Austria, and makes it impossible for the government of the United States to interfere in favor of political exiles and prisoners, in similar cases that may arise hereafter. On this ground alone, the agitation of Kossuth in this country is to be condemned.

There is another consideration which greatly strengthens the verdict of disapproval, which all impartial men must bring in, upon this proceeding; the impropriety of the *manner* in which it was conducted. It was obviously the duty of Kossuth — so obviously that the neglect of it strikes one with surprise — to present himself in Washington at the earliest moment after his arrival, and make his acknowledgments to the government to whom he owed his deliverance; and when he found, that, in the opinion of the administration, his demands were inadmissible, and inconsistent with the established policy of the country, he should have bowed to their decision. It was a gross breach of decorum to attempt, as he did, to create a public opinion in his favor, which should overawe the government; it was at the same time a grievous error. And if he acted, as has been said, under the advice of an American politician, whom he met in Europe, he has probably made up his mind by this time, that that gentleman has ends of his own to serve, quite as much as the interests of Hungary. Whatever intoxicated indivi-

duals or frantic multitudes may shout to the contrary, the government of the United States represents the people of the United States; and the project of appealing from the government to the people, is not only impertinent in a foreigner, but idle and foolish. Next to the Austrians, the worst enemies Kossuth has encountered, have been the clamorous blockheads who encouraged him in so Quixotic an enterprise.

Kossuth's assumption of the dignity of Governor of Hungary, as an existing and practical fact, was an absurdity too glaring to be argued against. His assumption of the right to issue bonds, pledging the revenues of Hungary to their future redemption; the appointment of committees to receive and collect funds, on the strength of secret information communicated by him, as to the political movements out of which the redemption of Hungary is to come; the curious programme of operations he gave in his last Faneuil Hall speech, the wild estimates he made of the resources of the party of agitation, and the still wilder description of the present power of Turkey and her readiness to plunge into the battle with Russia,—show at least the enthusiastic temperament of Kossuth, and the easy faith of the amiable gentlemen who lend themselves to his schemes.

His endeavors to set aside the authority of Washington, and to give a new interpretation to the Farewell Address, were again lamentable errors of judgment. The result has been, not to weaken the influence of Washington's great name and divine wisdom, but to freshen, in the minds of the people, a knowledge of his doctrines, and to exalt their reverence for his character. American intervention in European affairs is less likely to occur since Kossuth's visit, than it was before; because the people are better informed on all the bearings of the question, by the discussions to which his presence and his appeals have given rise. The impracticable character of the demand—to say nothing of the want of constitutional power to grant it—is well put by Mr. Stiles. "The absurdity of the intervention of the United States for the independence of Hungary cannot be more forcibly illustrated than by the consideration, that, of the fourteen millions of inhabitants in Hungary, nine millions desire

no more free or better government than that under which they now live." And yet Kossuth still pretends to be the lawful Governor of Hungary! Was Washington, in the course of his whole life, ever guilty of such a folly?

It is not true, that the policy bequeathed by the sacred legacy of Washington is a selfish and isolating one; on the contrary, it is noble, disinterested, and generous. It has saved us from squandering our resources, and endangering the very foundations of our national existence, by the costly interventions in European affairs, which have loaded England with a debt under which the understanding staggers; and it has enabled us to give a home to the houseless exile, shelter to the starving and perishing millions of the old world, and a fair opportunity to all who have the virtue to avail themselves of it, to rise up and assert the dignity of manhood. With a generosity unexampled in the history of the world, we open the gates of citizenship wide to all, of whatever nation, tongue, or religion, who wish to enter; so that the penniless immigrant, after a brief probation, takes his share in the privileges and duties of the republican citizen, and finds, not only the road to wealth as free to him as to his native-born neighbor, but the career to honors and distinctions in the state stretching onward invitingly before him. Is this the isolation of China or Japan, to which Kossuth foolishly compared the Washington policy of not intermeddling in the affairs of other nations? And does this state of things justify Kossuth's advice to the German population in America, to make the political influence bestowed on them by our broad and open-handed principles of humanity, a means of drawing the country into European intervention, and subserving the plans and passions of those from whom their oath of allegiance to the United States should have completely sundered them? No, indeed. The naturalized foreigner, who so interprets his duties to the country of his adoption, is unworthy of the position he has been allowed to take; he is a traitor to the government to which, renouncing all others, he has sworn faith and fealty. The author of such advice, however honestly it may be given, is strangely forgetful, in the blind zeal of his enthusiasm, of the most solemn obligations a human being ever assumes. Kossuth's

speeches and letter to the Germans are among the most reprehensible of his errors; and they who support him in such errors, sacrifice to the idol of the moment, not only their own self-respect, but, so far as their wishes may be crowned with success, the peace and happiness of the country.

Another fallacy put forward by the Hungarians and their friends, almost too transparent to be mentioned, is the statement that their position in this country is like that of Franklin in France, when he negotiated the French alliance and subsidy. The obvious difference is, that we then had an independent government, which we had maintained long enough to show the world that we were capable of standing our ground; while Hungary is completely incorporated into the Austrian Empire, by the same right which the Magyars asserted over Slavonia and Croatia, — the right of conquest. Another difference is, that France was ready to engage, for her own purposes, in war with England; and we are not ready, for our own or any other purposes, to engage in war with Austria and Russia. And a third point of difference is, that Franklin and Adams were the commissioned representatives of the Continental Congress, acting with the formal authority of a nation; and Kossuth and his train had no authority, no commission, no vestige of an official character, not even the approbation of those who were the most conspicuous of their partners in the strike for independence, and who, like them, are now eating the bitter bread of exile.

But we have run before the story. Let us return, for one moment, to the Hungarian revolutionary war, with which the chief celebrity of Kossuth will be forever identified. We think the position in which Kossuth placed himself, in accepting the post of President of the Committee of Defence, and afterwards revolutionary Governor of Hungary, just the one for which his peculiar genius least of all fitted him. The Hungarians had the right on their side, most unquestionably, to a certain point, as against Austria. The historical, constitutional, and legal arguments were all with them down to the dissolution of the Batthiányi ministry; on these arguments, their position was impregnable. But the revolutionary party erred

in pushing their cause beyond the line of strict legality, and thus adding to the already formidable advantages of their opponents, the seeming support and sanction of the law. In a word, they placed themselves in the attitude of rebels, against their liege sovereign, after the royal disapproval of Count Batthiányi's new ministry, and the attempt of the Emperor to put an end to the hostilities between the Hungarians and the Croatsians, under the Ban Jellachich. After these decisive acts of the government, the appointment of a Committee of Defence, in the autumn of 1848, was not only rash, being without the support of the leading members of the liberal party, but was technically an act of open rebellion; and from this time forth, Kossuth is the mainspring of the revolution. On the 6th of November, accordingly, Kossuth and his adherents were declared traitors by an Imperial proclamation, and the penalties of treason denounced against them. An important change in the aspect of the quarrel was brought about by the resignation of the Emperor Ferdinand, and the accession of his nephew, a youth only nineteen years old. Mr. Stiles describes him as follows.

"The Emperor Francis Joseph, son of the Archduke Francis Charles and of the Archduchess Sophia, is a youth of fine and manly appearance, tall and slender in stature, upright and military in his carriage, with an intelligent countenance, but, above all, distinguished for his remarkable self-possession. He is said to be endowed with an excellent mind, and to have acquired such a knowledge of the different languages of his empire as to enable him to address with fluency any portion of his subjects in their own tongue. His character, of course, remains yet to be developed; and if the anecdote related of his conduct, when first apprised of his elevation to the throne, be not a fiction, favorable anticipations may be entertained as respects his future career. When informed that he was emperor, Francis Joseph, sinking back upon the sofa, and covering his face with his hands, exclaimed, *Meine Jugend ist hin!* My youth is over! It was a noble exclamation for a boy of but nineteen years, for it told of duties accepted and of devotion to an arduous task. To be master in the fresh flush of youth of one of the greatest empires of the world, and to think first of the sacrifices which duty imposes rather than of the splendor which the position confers, exhibits an appreciation of the task as rarely to be met with, as it is indispensable to success in those that are born to rule." Vol. ii. pp. 151, 152.

The Schwartzenberg cabinet resolved to seize this opportunity to annihilate the Hungarian constitution, and with it the last vestiges of the independence of Hungary. They were incapable of the nobler and more generous policy, which the informal attempt of Mr. Stiles, in compliance with the request of Kossuth, to effect a reconciliation, gave them an opportunity of adopting. And so the Austrian government, and the youthful monarch, let pass one of those heaven-sent chances of doing a deed of immortal beneficence, which occur to rulers but too seldom in the ordinary course of human affairs. They plunged into the conflict with some show of legality on their side, it is true; but with a pedantic adherence to the letter of the law, they determined to prosecute it to the bloody end. Shame that the reign of the brilliant young Emperor should be inaugurated in the slaughter of his bravest and noblest, even if erring subjects! It was a sad and threatening omen for the future. He has reason to pray God to avert it from his head.

We cannot follow the scenes of the terrible drama that now opened, on the fields of Hungary. The details are ably given by Mr. Stiles, and many of them are of thrilling interest. But the Hungarians were doomed from the beginning. With two thirds of the Hungarian nation arrayed in fierce hostility against them, with some of the most important classes of the Magyars themselves looking upon the conflict with doubt, disapprobation, or despair, with the powerful sentiment of loyalty to the Austrian crown still lingering in the breasts of many of the best officers, no temporary successes could do more than postpone, for a brief moment, her swift destruction. On the one side, the promulgation of a constitution for the empire in March, 1849, and on the other, the declaration of Hungarian Independence on the 14th of the following April, both measures of the extremest violence, cutting off all hope of reconciliation, and removing all disposition for it on either side, placed the contending parties in the attitude of war to the death. Certainly, the Emperor, after this act, could no longer claim to be king of Hungary according to the constitution; for the constitution, by which he was bound to govern Hungary, was to be wholly displaced by the new one. Certainly,

the revolutionists could not claim to stand on the constitution; for they, too, had long since been laboring to effect its overthrow, and finished their work by the banishment of the House of Hapsburg, and the tumultuary appointment of Kossuth as Governor, with the power of selecting a cabinet at his own will. Both parties had thrown the constitution to the winds, and both had alike appealed to the sharp arbitrament of the sword.

The declaration of independence was a rash act, productive of the most lamentable consequences. It was proposed by Kossuth in the Diet, on the 13th of April, and having been debated, was finally carried, not by the deliberate votes of all the members, but by less than a quorum, amidst a storm of plaudits from the crowd in the galleries of the Calvinistic church, in Debreczin, to which Kossuth, followed by his adherents, had adjourned. In the preliminary debate of the 13th, Kovacs, one of the leaders of the band, significantly said, "Here we are in possession of only the half of the kingdom of Hungary, and you are sending a challenge to all the monarchs of Europe. Buda, the capital, is still in the hands of the imperialists; and by attacking the monarchical principle, you procure for Austria the sympathy of all crowned heads, and peril all that we have already gained." One of the opposition, being asked why his party did not protest against this, replied, "Because, first of all, no man was such a fool as to expose himself to be murdered by the mob. Besides, in my eyes, the meeting had not a legal character."

We cannot dwell longer on these interesting events. The warning of Kovacs was well founded. The victories gained by the Hungarians in the first campaign, brilliant as they were, gave no security to Hungary. The sympathy of the crowned heads for Austria brought the Czar and his irresistible armies upon the scene. England, France, and Turkey did not fulfil the dream of Kossuth; and the interference of Russia was not judged, by those powers, a violation of the law of nations. The government of the United States sent an agent to watch the course of events, with the view of acknowledging the independence of Hungary as soon as she showed herself capable of maintaining a national existence. But he had

scarcely time to commence his inquiries, before the Hungarian generals had laid down their arms, and Kossuth had fled over the Turkish frontier. And yet Kossuth had the face to accuse the United States of being accessory to the ruin of Hungary, by not acknowledging her independence, — an independence that never for a single moment existed; and if the Chevalier Hülsemann is to be credited, Mr. Dudley Mann would have been hanged as a spy, if the Austrian government had had the least notion of what was the object of his mission, and could have laid their hands on him. *From the declaration of independence to the surrender of Vilagos was exactly four months.*

The history of the last-named event, and the character of General Görgey, the principal actor in the closing scenes of the war, have been the subjects of vehement dispute. Görgey has very generally been pronounced a traitor to his country. A learned committee, of the last Massachusetts Senate, very unceremoniously handed him over to the execrations of posterity; and the Senate accepted the report, that his "name will be gibbeted by history between those of Iscariot [it should have been Judas Iscariot] and Arnold."

Mr. Stiles, in a more impartial spirit, sums up the considerations for and against him. Among the latter, the strongest was the fact that he had kept silent two years, under the obloquy and execrations with which his name had been loaded. Since Mr. Stiles's book appeared, General Görgey has published a full account of his course in the Hungarian war. It is not written in the most amiable temper towards those who have vindicated themselves by slandering him. Under the circumstances, and considering the enormous outrages to which his reputation has been subjected, while he has remained helpless under the supervision of the Austrian police, some bitterness of feeling and acerbity of expression are quite intelligible and pardonable. As the fog begins to clear away from that tragic catastrophe, enough is seen to prove conclusively, that there is not a shadow of evidence that Görgey was guilty of the crimes charged against him. On the contrary, he was not only the ablest man the revolution produced, and foresaw the fatal consequences of Kossuth's

proceedings, but he warned him of them. He was a man of action, and had no respect for the man of phrases;—and here he erred. But he was right in his general estimate of Kossuth's dangerous influence, and the utterly erroneous calculations on which his policy was built. He and the army generally, except Kossuth's raw recruits, disapproved of the declaration of independence, and clearly foreboded the disastrous end to which it was leading them. But most of the military glory gained by the Hungarians was owing to his brilliant genius. He kept the army in an efficient state, as long as that was possible; and when longer resistance was unavailing, the supreme power was placed in his hands, with a distinct understanding between Kossuth and himself, that he was to lay down his arms to the Russian general. Kossuth fled, and Görgey remained to bear the brunt of accumulating horrors that impended over him. His letter to General Rudiger breathes a magnanimous spirit; offering himself as a victim, but imploring the General to spare his companions in arms. His officers, who unanimously approved of the surrender, by a vote passed at a council of war from which Görgey was absent, were inspired by an equal magnanimity of resolution, and consummated the act of pacification with a full conviction that their lives would be forfeited to the vengeance of the conqueror. By a cruel clemency, Görgey was spared, while the military executions, perpetrated by Haynau, the blood-stained pedant of the military code, shocked the world by their atrocities, and made the name of the hoary murderer a by-word of infamy to the end of time.

Görgey furnishes the only rational explanation of the dictatorship and the surrender. It is the only view of the event, consistent with its antecedents and consequences, and with the conduct of Kossuth; and it is a remarkable fact, that, while the Kossuth party in Europe and this country have been permitted to blacken the name of Görgey with unmeasured vituperation, Kossuth himself has but rarely and feebly sanctioned these accusations by his own authority.